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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION v. TRANS WORLD 
AIRLINES, INC.: LIMITING AIR CARRIER LIABILITY 
UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 17, 1984 the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in 
Franklin Mint Corporation v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 1• Holding 
that the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was acting in a manner con-
sistent with the Warsaw Convention,2 the Court approved a limita-
tion of liability for air carriers of $9.07 per pound of cargo. 
The opinion's significance is threefold. First, the $9.07 per 
pound limitation was the lowest amount feasible under the stric-
tures of the Warsaw Convention.3 In essence, the low level limits 
the responsibility of air carriers while placing the risk on the con-
sumers of shipping and passenger services.3a 
The second critical aspect of the case is that the Court justifies 
the CAB's limited liability level in part because that level is close' 
to limitation levels set using Special Drawing Rights (SDR).5 While 
1. 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984). 
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, done Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3014, T.S. No. 876. (effective Feb. 18, 1933) 
[hereinafter cited as Convention]. 
3. Article 22(4) of the Convention relates the limitation of liability to an amount equal 
to 65 1/2 miligrams of gold per franc, with a limit of 250 francs per delogram of cargo. Id. 
art. 22(4). Using the market price of gold at the time of the suit the possible liability equals 
approximately $560 per pound. Alternatively, if the SDR unit currently adopted by the War-
saw Convention, but not ratified by the United States, were to be used the liability would 
be limited to $7,100. or $9.94 per pound. The CAB's $9.04 per pound limit is obviously the 
lowest. 
3a. The low liability level may affect liability for passenger injury as well as cargo 
limitations. Article 22(1) of the Convention applies the gold standard of Article 22(4) to 
passenger liability, id. art. 22(1), thus Franklin Mint can affect passenger liability. However, 
the 1966 Montreal Agreement established a higher limit to passenger liability; $75,000 per 
person to be precise. The agreement is an inter-carrier agreement, not a governmental agree-
ment. Accordingly, only those carriers participating in the agreement are bound by it. 
Further, the agreement only addresses flights into and out of the United States. Therefore, 
while Franklin Mint may limit passenger liability under Article 22(1), the use of 22(1) has 
been limited by the Montreal Agreement. 
4. See supra note 3. 
5. The Special Drawing Rights (SDR) are lines of credit against which banks may 
borrow. The value of one SDR unit is derived from a basket of five currencies. "The amount 
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the SDR has been adopted by the Warsaw Convention as part of 
the Montreal Protocols,6 the Protocols have not been ratified by 
the U.S. Senate. Accordingly, the Court's reliance on the SDR ap-
pears as a judicial approval of the Protocols, or at the very least, 
encouragement for Senate ratification of the Protocols. Either in-
terpretation indicates judicial willingness for involvement with 
traditional legislative functions. 
Thirdly, the opinion is significant because the Court recogniz-
ed that the 1978 repeal of the Par Value Modification Act (1978 Act),7 
removing U.S. currency from a gold standard, did not prevent ap-
plication of the Warsaw Convention.8 This holding implies that other 
gold base limitations of liability have not been rendered inapplicable 
by the 1978 Act and that the appropriate agencies can still ad-
minister gold to dollar conversions. 
This article will describe the facts of Franklin Mint, and the 
relevant background. The district court, circuit court and Supreme 
Court opinions will be reviewed, with particular attention and 
analysis given to the Supreme Court opinion. This analysis will 
highlight the significant implications of the case. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
In March of 1979 Franklin Mint Corporation shipped 714 pounds 
of numismatic materials from Philadelphia to London using Trans 
World Airlines (TWA) as the carrier. Franklin's goods were lost 
in transit, thereby rendering Trans World liable for the goods under 
Article 18 of the Warsaw Convention.9 Because Franklin had failed 
of each currency in one SDR is a function of the percentage weights, which are assigned 
to each currency in the basket. The dollar value of one SDR is then determined by adding 
the 'dollar values of each currency component based on daily market exchange rates."' 690 
F .2d at 310 (quoting Ward, The SDR in Transport Liability Conventions: Some Clarification, 
13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 2, 3 (1981). 
6. Montreal Protocol No. 4, done Sept. 25, 1975. 
7. The Par Value Modification Act, 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1976) had devalued the worth 
of the dollar in terms of gold. The 1978 Act, Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1976, Pub. 
L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2660 (1976), repealed this and removed the United States from 
a gold based currency. 
8. The Warsaw Convention appears to require a gold based currency to function. 
No other conversion factor from gold to currency other than the official price of gold was 
apparent. However, the Court did not read the Warsaw Convention in a restrictive man-
ner, but instead allowed a CAB determined conversion factor. 
9. Article 18(1) states that "[t]he carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the 
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to declare that the goods were of special value, TWA sought to limit 
its liability by invoking Article 22.10 
B. The Legal Facts 
The main issue of Franklin Mint was whether Article 22(4) was 
applicable after the 1978 Act repealed the U.S. gold standard. This 
broke down into three subissues: (1) whether the 1978 Act had 
amended the Warsaw Convention; (2) whether the Warsaw Conven-
tion specifically required that the official price of gold be used in 
converting gold to currency; and (3) whether the conversion factor 
used by the CAB was correct. 
To comprehend the emergence of these issues it is important 
to understand the historical background of the 1979 Act and the 
Warsaw Convention. During the 1960's world usage of a gold stan-
dard began deteriorating. In the United States this was evidenced 
by the Par Value Modification Acts of 197211 and 1973.12 Respond-
ing to the deterioration of the world gold standard, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) met in 1975 and substituted the SDR 
for gold based currency.13 The United States responded in 1976 by 
adopting the SDR.14 This adoption went into effect in 1978 and is 
referred to as the 1978 Act.15 Thus, the issue is whether the 1978 
Act renders Article 22(4) of the Warsaw Convention inapplicable 
event of the destruction or loss of, or damage to, any checked baggage or any goods, if the 
occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place during the transportation by 
air." Convention, supra note 2, art. 19(1). 
10. Article 22(2) of the Convention specifically states that "[i]n the transportation of 
checked baggage and of goods, the liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 
francs per kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when the package was handed 
over to the carrier, a special declaration of the the value at delivery and has paid a sup-
plementary' sum if the case so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum 
not exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that the sum is greater than the actual 
value of the consignor at delivery." Id. art. 22(2). Article 22(4) goes on to add that "[t]he sums 
mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting of 65.5 milligrams 
of gold at the standard fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may be converted 
into any national currency in round figures." Id. art. 22(4). 
11. Par Value Modification Act, 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1982). 
12. Par Value Modification Act, 31 U.S.C. § 449 (repealed 1978). 
13. Second Amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund, done Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.l.A.S. No. 8937 (effective May l, 1978). Also known 
as the Jamaica Accords. 
14. See supra note 7. 
15. See also Gold, Gold in International Monetary Law: Change, Uncertainty, and 
Ambiguity, 15 J. INT"L L. & ECON. 323 (1981), for further historical background. 
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due to Article 22(4)'s apparent reliance on a gold based currency. 
Resolution of this issue was somewhat complicated by the fact 
that the 1975 Montreal Protocols16 to the Warsaw Convention 
adopted the SDR in place of the gold standard. While the United 
States signed the Montreal Protocols, they were never ratified by 
the Senate.17 Thus, it should not affect the United States' interpreta-
tion of the Convention. 
In sum, the demise of the gold standard has apparently affected 
application of the Warsaw Convention. It was into this factual and 
historical background that the district court was placed by Franklin 
Mint. 
III. COURT DECISIONS 
A. District Court 
The district court18 was faced with the following dilemma: [i]f 
it recognized that the 1978 Act had altered the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the Convention would become unworkable.18a On the other 
hand if it refused to acknowledge the impact of the 1978 Act, the 
court would apparently be acting contrary to valid legislation. 
To resolve this problem the court refused to explicitly 
acknowledge the dilemma. Instead, the court deferred to the govern-
ment's interpretation of the Warsaw Convention and the 1978 Act, 
an interpretation exemplified by the CAB's19 choice of $9.07 per 
pound as the converted liability limit. In addition, the court noted 
that Franklin Mint and TWA had agreed to this limit since TWA 
had this limitation printed on its tickets. Accordingly, the court 
limited Franklin Mint's recovery to $6,475.98.20 
It is interesting to observe that the court used TWA's brief 
as its opinion, noting that it would save time for the appeal. 
Obviously, the court realized it had left much to be resolved by the 
circuit court. 
16. See supra note 6. 
17. See also Hollings, Defeat of the Montreal Protocols: Victory for Airline Passengers, 
18 TRIAL 69-70 (May 1982). 
18. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
18a. Id. Denial of the gold standard would preclude application of the gold standard 
by the Convention. The CAB was considered to represent the government in application 
of the Convention. 
19. Id. at 1289. 
20. While not discussing them, the court did note the four possible conversion rates. 
These included the SDR, the last official price of gold as used by the CAB, the exchange 
value of the current French franc, and the free market price of gold. Id. 
4
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B. Circuit Court 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard the appeal 
on April 22, 1982.21 The circuit court reversed the district court and 
held that the Warsaw Convention's limitation of liability, while ap-
plicable to Franklin Mint, would be unenforceable 60 days hence. 
This decision has been the topic of considerable debate22 due to the 
practical consequences, and the possible legal implications for other 
gold based treaties.23 
The court based its decision on the fact that the 1978 Act had 
directly affected the Convention and had "undermined the Conven-
tion's unit of conversion."24 Additionally, the court found that there 
was "no United States legislation specifying a (conversion) unit to 
be used by ... United States Courts."25 
Having explicity acknowledged a conflict between the 1978 Act 
and the Warsaw Convention, the court outlined three controlling 
facts in the case. First, the Warsaw Convention required some con-
version unit to convert judgments into domestic currency. Second, 
there was no longer any internationally agreed upon conversion unit. 
Thirdly, no United States legislation had established a conversion 
unit to be used by the courts. 26 
The first two facts were considered self-evident from the 
history of international monetary turmoil as well as the diversity 
of conversion units used by various countries.27 The third fact was, 
however, more troublesome. The court found that the CAB, who 
the district court had deferred to as the government's spokesman,28 
21. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982). 
22. See also Note, Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention and Franklin Mint v. TWA: 
A Conflict Between Treaty and Municiple Statute, 16 CORNELL lNT'L L.J. 397 (1983). Recent 
Development, Aviation: Enforceability of Warsaw Convention Limits on Liability in the United 
States. Franklin Mint v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 24 HARV. INT'L L.J. 183 (1983). 
23. Practically, the decision limited Franklin Mint's recovery, but prospectively it 
abolished airline liability limits because the Warsaw Convention was considered unworkable. 
This caused great uncertainty in the airline industry. Further, the invalidation of the War-
saw Convention's use of a gold standard might infer that all other treaties using a gold 
standard will not be enforced by the Untied States courts. 
24. 690 F.2d at 308. 
25. Id. at 309. 
26. Id. at 309. 
27. Sweden, Britain, Italy and the Netherlands had used SDR's as conversion factors. 
The French had used the current French franc, and the United States, Greece and India 
had used the free market price of gold. In addition one United States court as well as the 
CAB relied on the last official price of gold. Id. at 308-09 n.14-19. 
28. The CAB was considered to be an arm of the government and therefore, providing 
5
D.: Recent Development
Published by SURFACE, 1984
656 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 11:651 
was acting in a manner inconsistent with the actions of Congress. 
Specifically, the court found that Congress had repealed the last 
official price of gold by the 1978 Act. Accordingly, "[t]he case for 
continuing to use the now repealed price of gold ... finds no sup-
port in law or logic."29 Thus, the CAB's use of the previous gold 
standard was inappropriate. 
Next the court disapproved the use of SDRs, the French franc, 
and the free market price of gold. The latter two were rejected 
because they were considered unstable and would thus undermine 
the purposes of the Warsaw Convention. SDRs were rejected by 
the court because the Senate had not ratified the Montreal Pro-
tocols. Use of SDRs in the Warsaw Convention would, therefore, 
have been contrary to the will of Congress. 
Thus, the circuit court found that the 1978 Act had directly 
affected the Warsaw Convention. In so doing, the court found that 
the Warsaw Convention's Article 22 limitation of liability was in-
operable. Franklin Mint appealed this decision. 
C. Supreme Court 
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the $9.07 limitation of 
liability and the resultant $6,475.98 judgment for Franklin Mint.30 
However, the Court reversed the circuit court's prospective in-
validation of the Warsaw Convention. In particular, the Court held 
that the 1978 Act did not alter Article 22 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, and that the CAB could make the gold to currency conver-
sion using any conversion factor that was reasonable to the pur-
poses of the Convention. 
The Court addressed two issues: [f]irst, whether the 1978 Act 
had altered the Warsaw Convention; and second, whether the CAB 
has selected an appropriate conversion factor. Similar to the Second 
Circuit's analysis, the Court reviewed the history of the Warsaw 
Convention and the demise of the world gold standard, noting the 
Jamaica Accords30a and the Montreal Protocols. In addition, the Court 
reviewed the administration of Article 22 of the Convention in the 
governmental support to a particular unit of conversion. In this case, the last official price 
of gold. 
29. Id. at 309. 
30. 104 S. Ct. at 1776. 
30a. See supra note 13. 
6
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United States. The Court observed that "[i]n the United States the 
task of converting the Convention's liability limit into 'any national 
currency' falls within rule making authority which was ... delegated 
to the CAB under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958."31 Moreover, 
the Court noted that "CAB powers are to be exercised 'consistent-
ly with any obligation assumed by the United States in any trea-
ty, convention, or agreement that may be in force between the 
United States and any foreign country or foreign countries.' "32 In-
itially then, the Court recognized that some administrative discre-
tion was proper in the application of the Warsaw Convention. 
Having reviewed the history and defined the role of the CAB, 
the Court addressed the threshold issue of whether "the 1978 repeal 
of the Par Value Modification Act rendered the Convention's cargo 
liability limit unenforceable in the United States."33 In direct 
opposition to the Second Circuit's holding the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the 1978 Act had not undermined Article 22 of the War-
saw Convention. 
Four reasons were cited for refuting any change in the Con-
vention as a result of the 1978 Act. First, the Court, citing Cook 
v. United States,34 determined that "'a treaty will not be deemed 
to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such 
purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed."'35 
Because the 1978 Act made no mention of the Warsaw Convention, 
the Court found that the 1978 Act did not alter the Convention.36 
Second, the Court recognized the Convention as a self-executing 
treaty and thus independent of purely domestic legislation.37 
Accordingly, the 1978 Act could not implicitly abrogate the 
Convention. 
Third, the Court noted that any signatory nation wishing to 
withdraw from the Warsaw Convention was required to give six 
months notice.38 No such notice was given in relation to the 1978 
31. Id. at 1780. 
32. Id. at 1781, citing 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982). 
33. Id. at 1782. 
34. 288 U.S. 102 (1933). 
35. 104 S. Ct. at 1783, (quoting Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933)). 
36. 104 S. Ct. at 1783. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
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Act. Thus, the Court reasoned that the 1978 act did not nullify ap-
plication of the Warsaw Convention to the United States.39 
Finally, the Court refused to adopt Franklin Mint's argument 
that the treaty was abrogated due to a substantial change in cir-
cumstances brought about through the 1978 Act. The Court rejected 
Franklin's argument because the change in circumstances doctrine40 
is only applicable when a party to the treaty asserts the change 
in circumstances. In the present case, the parties to the treaty con-
tinued to assert the vitality of the treaty. Because Franklin had 
no power to assert the doctrine, the Convention was still viable. 
After determining that the 1978 Act had not abrogated the 
Convention, the Court next addressed the proper application of the 
Convention.41 As noted previously, the Court recognized the CAB 
as the appropriate administering agency. In addition, it also 
observed that the CAB had, since the initial demise of the gold stan-
dard in 1968,42 been administering Article 22 liabilities independently 
from an official price of gold. The last CAB review of its conver-
sion rate occurred in 1978 and it affirmed the $9.07 per pound limita-
tion. This limitation was codified by CAB order 7 4-1-16 at 14 CFR 
§ 221.176, and was in effect when Franklin Mint's goods were lost. 
During the period the United States used a gold based cur-
rency, the appropriate conversion factor was simply the dollar 
equivalent of gold. However, once gold was abolished as the basis 
of the currency, the CAB's discretion determined the conversion 
factor. The issue before the Court then became whether the CAB 
had properly exercised its discretion. The CAB's discretion would 
be upheld only if its conversion rate was consistent with the 
Convention.43 
A crucial preliminary issue arose as to whether it was possi-
ble for the CAB to act in a manner consistent with the Convention 
while setting a conversion factor independently from an official price 
of gold.44 The Court found that while Article 22(4) states that "[t]he 
39. Id. 
40. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. 
41. While the Court addressed itself to the impact of the 1978 Act on the Convention, 
it did not analyze the implications of the Montreal Protocols. Technically these Protocols 
have not been ratified by the Untied States, nevertheless they were signed by the United 
States. 
42. See supra text accompanying notes 10-17. 
43. 49 U.S.C. § 1502 requires that the CAB act in a manner consistant with any treaties 
currently in force. 
44. Id. 
8
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sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the French franc 
consisting of 65.5 milligrams of gold ... These sums may be con-
verted into any national currency in round fiqures." 45 This was merely 
a permissive conversion according to the Court and it was domestic 
legislation that required and controlled this conversion.46 Conver-
sion was therefore not controlled by the reference to gold in the 
Convention, and the CAB could legitimately set a conversion factor 
independent from the price of gold. 
Even though the CAB could independently establish the con-
version factor it was still required to act in a manner consistent 
with the Convention. To determine whether the CAB was acting 
appropriately, the Court evaluated the CAB's action in relation to 
the purposes of the Warsaw Convention. The Court determined that 
the Convention's most obvious purpose was to set some limit on 
liability. Since any conversion factor would serve this purpose the 
CAB's $9.07 per pound limit was proper. 
The court defined the second purpose as setting a "stable, 
predictable and internationally uniform limit."47 Finding that the 
$9.07 limit was stable and predictable, the Court nevertheless noted 
that international uniformity would prove more troublesome. To 
compensate for this perceived lack of uniformity, the Court noted 
that uniformity "might require periodic adjustment by the CAB of 
the dollar based limit to account both for the dollars changing value 
relative to other western currencies, and, if necessary, for changes 
in the conversion rates adopted by other Convention signatories."48 
Regardless of the necessity of these adjustments the CAB conver-
sion factor based on the last official price of gold was judged to 
be consistent with the purposes of the Convention. 
Another factor contributing to the CAB's consistency with the 
Convention was the similarity of the $9.07 limitation to the limita-
45. 104 S. Ct. at 1780 (emphasis added). 
46. The conversion was required by the tariffs of § 1373(a) of the Federal Aviation 
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. Specifically, in note 25 the Court stated that "the Convention 
specifies liability limits in terms of gold francs and provides no unit of conversion what-
soever .... The Convention invites signatories to make the conversion into national curren-
cies for themselves. In the United States the CAB has been delegated the power to make 
the conversion .... " 104 S. Ct. at 1784 n.25. 
47. 104 S. Ct. at 1785. 
48. Id. 
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tion that would have been imposed had the U.S. ratified the Mon-
treal Protocols and adopted SDR's as the conversion factor. This 
limit would have been more than nine dollars per pound. 
A third and final purpose of the Convention highlighted by the 
Court was that the liability limitation was to reflect a constant value 
that would accurately reflect inflation and thus remain equitable 
to both carriers and customers. The Court admitted that a set dollar 
amount of $9.07 per pound would not serve this purpose. However, 
between 1934 and 1978 the signatories had allowed the liability limit 
to diverge from the value of shipped goods. In light of this practice 
the Court interpreted the treaty as a contract to be defined by the 
conduct of the parties. Thus, because the parties had allowed the 
liability limit to diverge from the value of the shipped goods, a CAB 
limit that also allowed divergence was considered consistent with 
the Convention. 
In sum, the Court found that the 1978 Act did not change the 
Convention. The Convention, however, did not control the gold to 
currency conversion factor. That was within the control of each 
signatory. In the United States that power was delegated to the 
CAB, and in this instance the CAB had acted properly in setting 
a conversion factor and liability limit consistent with the 
Convention. 
The dissent disagreed with the majority's analysis and instead 
focused on what it perceived as the plain meaning of the Conven-
tion. The dissent agreed that the Convention was not altered by 
the 1978 Act, but read Article 22(4) to require a gold to currency 
conversion based on the current market price of gold, regardless 
of that price's independence from any official price of gold. 
The dissent quoted De Geofrey v. Riggs,49 which stated that" '[i]t 
is a general principle of construction with respect to treaties that 
they shall be liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent 
intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between 
them. As they are contracts between independent nations, in their 
construction words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning .... ' "50 
According to the dissent, the ordinary meaning of Article 22(4) 
required the conversion factor be the current price of gold.51 The 
49. Id. at 1788 (quoting De Geofroy v. Ziggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890)). 
50. Id. at 1790-91. 
51. Id. 
10
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1984], Art. 7
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss3/7
1984) Recent Development 661 
dissent found that the ordinary meaning of the Convention was 
determined by its intent.52 The Convention's intent was interpreted 
by the dissent to be international uniformity of liability value.53 The 
dissent reasoned that a conversion rate and liability limitation 
established unilaterally by an agency of one nation would not be 
uniform.54 In addition, the dissent noted that unilateral limits were 
specifically rejected by the framers of the Convention.55 Thus, in 
recognizing that the Convention was still in full force following the 
1978 Act, the dissent narrowly interpreted the Convention's intent 
and meaning. Accordingly, it found the proper conversion rate to 
be the current market price of gold. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In addition to Franklin Mint's limitation of liability for cargo 
and passenger liability,553 the case has potential significance for the 
interpretation of other gold based treaties. Had the Court adopted 
the reasoning of the circuit court and nullified the Warsaw Con-
vention, other gold based treaties56 could also have been legitimately 
disregarded resulting in great confusion for the commercial and 
diplomatic worlds.57 
While the Court's opinion appears to preclude this possibility, 
the opinion does leave open a means whereby a gold based stan-
dard could be inoperable. The Court makes it clear that the 1978 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
55a. See supra note 3a and accompanying text. 
56. At the time the Warsaw Convention was signed gold clauses were contained in 
the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of St. Germain, the Treaty of Triavon and other inter-
national agreements. Additionally, gold clauses are .contained in a number of transporta-
tion treaties. These include the International Convention relating to the Limitation of Liability 
of Owners of Seagoing Vessels June 2, 1930, 120 L.N.T.S. 123, the International Convention 
on the contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, May 19, 1956, 399 U.N.T.S. 
189, the International Convention for the Clarification of Certain Rules of Law relating to 
Bills of Lading for the Carriage of Goods by Sea, done Aug. 22, 1924, [1937), 51 Stat. 233, 
T.S. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 (effective Dec. 29, 1937). The U.S. has adopted this last Conven-
tion and is bound by it. Thus, Franklin Mint is directly applicable. While the other Conven-
tions have not been adopted by the U.S. it is conceivable that the U.S. courts would be forced 
to apply these Conventions. Accordingly, the courts could be confronted with a problem 
similar to Franklin Mint, and they could proceed using Franklin Mint's analysis. See infra 
note 57. 
57. See supra note 22. See also Asser, Golden Limitations of Liability in International 
Transport Conventions and the Currency Crisis, 5 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 645 (1973). 
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Act did not directly alter the Warsaw Convention. Then, reading 
the unaffected language of Article 22(4),58 the Court found that it 
did not specify a conversion factor for the voluntary translation of 
gold into national currencies.59 The court thus severed the conver-
sion factor from an official price of gold. Had the language of Arti-
cle 22(4) specified that the conversion factor was to be based on 
an official price of gold, severance would have been impossible. 
Accordingly, the absence of an official price of gold would have 
prevented application of the Warsaw Convention. 
The Court's analysis might additionally allow other gold based 
treaties to be inoperable by an invalidation of the administering 
agency's actions. In Franklin Mint, the CAB's use of the pre-1978 
official price of gold as a conversion factor was upheld because it 
was consistent with the purposes of the Warsaw Convention.60 
However, it is conceivable that the actions of the agency would be 
inconsistent with the purposes of the treaty and thus invalid. 
Accordingly, to secure the applicability of a gold based treaty 
in light of the 1978 Act, Franklin Mint requires that: (1) the con-
version of gold to currency be accomplished using a conversion fac-
tor severable from the official price of gold; (2) the purposes of the 
treaty be accurately identified and; (3) the actions of the administer-
ing agency in setting a conversion factor be shown consistent with 
these purposes. 
Another significant aspect of the case is highlighted by the 
Court's analysis of the CAB-set-conversion rate. As noted 
previously, the Court required that rate to be consistent with the 
purposes of the Warsaw Convention. In finding that the CAB's rate 
was proper, it was noted that this rate was very similar to the SDR 
rate. Inasmuch as the SDR rate was adopted by the Montreal Pro-
tocols, but was not ratified by the U.S. Senate, the Court's use of 
the SDR places it at odds with the Senate. The Court's use of the 
SDR must then be regarded as either judicial ratification of the 
Montreal Protocols, or as a recommendation for ratification of those 
Protocols. Regardless which view is adopted, the Court has ap-
parently entered into treaty politics. 
58. See supra note 10. 
59. See supra note 46. 
60. See supra, text accompanying notes 30-55. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In Franklin Mint the Court has provided a means whereby gold 
based treaties can continue to be operable even after repeal of a 
gold standard currency. Of necessity the CAB, as the administer-
ing agency, was given discretion to operate the treaty after the 
1978 Act. However, the CAB's actions could still be held inconsis-
tent with the treaty. 
A possible path around this problem and one hinted at by the 
Court, would be the adoption by the United States of the SDR. The 
SDR has been recognized as a legitimate substitute for a gold based 
currency, one consistent with the purpose of the treaty.61 Thus, 
legislation that required administering agencies to employ the SDR 
as a conversion factor instead of the non-official price of gold would 
serve both the purpose of the treaty and provide for consistent ad-
ministration of gold based treaties by the United States. 
Steven D. Mellema 
61. The Jamaica Accords and the Montreal Protocol both substitute the SDR for gold 
based currency. 
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